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THE ‘EUROPEANIZATION’ OF THE BASEL PROCESS:  
FINANCIAL HARMONIZATION BETWEEN GLOBALIZATION AND 
PARLIAMENTARIZATION 
Abstract: Public policy initiatives aimed at the prevention of future financial crises 
originate with global harmonization in the form of executive standards issued by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.  This article explores the role of the 
European Parliament (EP) in the process of adapting the standards in EU legislation 
passed in 2013 as the Capital Requirements Regulation/Capital Requirements Directive 
IV.  Unlike accounts casting the European Parliament as increasingly dependent upon 
outside sources in order to meet its enhanced legislative role, we find it increasingly 
dexterous in developing and using in-house policy ideas, expertise, and not least a 
common sense of institutional purpose.  Notable EP successes in final legislation 
include (but are not restricted to) a headline cap on bankers’ bonuses in the face of 
entrenched business and national interests.  The argument is developed by drawing upon 
a broad range of interviews together with other primary and secondary sources, tracing 
the contribution of the EP from the early stages of agenda-setting through to the 
development of an ‘esprit de corps’ among the committee lead team which survived 
intact throughout the ‘black box’ of trilogue negotiations.  Besides illuminating the 
notoriously opaque trilogue process, the analysis also contributes to contemporary 
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debates about whether the EP’s increased legislative powers is resulting in a shift away 
from its traditional allegiances with diffuse interests towards a greater engagement with 
producer sources in order to fulfill requirements for policy expertise. 
Keywords: Financial Regulation; European Parliament; trilogues; diffuse and specific 
interests. 
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Introduction 
This article explores the role of the EP, Europe’s directly-elected legislature, in the 
Basel process on banking supervision.  It is located at the intersection of two bodies of 
scholarship.  One the one hand, scholars of global financial regulation have traditionally 
described the Basel process as the quintessential exercise of executive power.  The 
process is commonly viewed as the domaine reservé of regulators institutionalized in 
various intertwined arenas at the national, EU, and global levels (Slaughter 2004; 
Busch, 2012; Adamati and Hellwig, 2013).  Parliamentary actors are hardly considered 
as relevant, let alone powerful, players, in this area of global regulation.  At the same 
time, however, the recent scholarship on global financial regulations suggests that a new 
era of financial regulation is materializing in the wake of the crisis (Helleiner and 
Pagliari 2011). This new era is characterized by wider domestic politicization, as 
elected leaders and legislatures are more likely to intervene in financial regulation. They 
expect politicization to lead to political fragmentation, regulatory decentralization 
around regional blocks, and ultimately the weakening of international financial 
standards. From a different perspective, Posner (2009) claims that a shift took place at 
the turn of the millennium as a more balanced pattern of transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation developed. As regulatory competences started migrating to the EU level, 
the number of foreign operators ‘willing to accept a regulator’s decisions to gain access 
to customers and suppliers’ increases (Posner 2009, 679), eventually generating new 
incentives for US authorities to accommodate EU demands.  In other words, regulatory 
centralization at the EU level increased the global clout of European authorities.  These 
findings do not yet add up into a coherent picture of contemporary global financial 
regulation, but suggest that regulatory competences are being recast across jurisdictional 
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levels and politicians are redefining their role—we have yet to understand how this 
happens and what the effects of these changes are. 
 
On the other hand, scholars of EU politics have in the last decade claimed that ‘a 
parliamentary Europe’ has emerged as the EP, and to a lesser extent national 
parliaments, have sought and obtained important powers in EU politics (Judge and 
Earnshaw 2008; Crum and Fossum 2009).  The EP is the institution, which has gained 
most power relative to other EU institutions in the last three decades of EU treaty 
reform. From the Single European Act onward, every EU treaty has conferred increased 
legislative power to the EP, making it ‘one of the most powerful elected chambers in the 
world’ (Hix et al 2003, 192).  The legislative empowerment of the EP in EU treaties, 
which we refer to here as ‘the parliamentarization of EU politics’, clearly puts European 
integration beyond the pale of diplomatic politics while attesting to the power of 
democratic norms of legitimacy in treaty-making politics (Rittberger, 2004).  What 
happens in the wake of the constitutional empowerment of the EP, and how the EP 
wields its new-gained powers, however, still remains a matter of debate.  While scholars 
traditionally viewed the EP as the eager advocate of broad consumer and citizen 
concerns  (Pollack, 1997; Burns, 2005), its growing legislative powers have led some to 
question whether the EP remains a champion of diffuse interests (Rasmussen, 2012; 
2014).   A growing trend has been for most EU legislation to be concluded through First 
Reading Agreements (FRAs) between the EP and the Council of Ministers (CoM), 
achieved through ‘informal’ though standardized negotiations in a ‘trilogue’ process 
between the EP, CoM and the European Commission (Rasmussen and Reh, 2014), with 
81% of all legislation agreed through FRAs in the 7th legislative term (2009-14) 
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(European Parliament, 2014).  As we describe later, concluding legislative agreements 
in this way requires each of the participating institutions to prioritize their goals, and to 
be prepared to give way on lower priority goals during the course of negotiations in 
order to achieve more cherished objectives. 
 
At the intersection of these two bodies of scholarship, we explore the domestic politics 
of the Basel process in order to improve our understanding of financial transformation 
in Europe, the role the EP plays in EU regulatory centralization, as well as the impact of 
EP political intervention on the content and stringency of Basel financial rules.  We 
focus on the Basel III Accord, agreed in November 2010 in the wake of the financial 
crisis in order to respond to the deficiencies of international financial markets.  Its main 
objective was aimed at strengthening bank capital holdings by increasing bank liquidity 
and decreasing bank leverage.  A broad coalition of actors in the new-established G-20 
underpinned Basel III, acting with a sense of urgency (Rottier and Véron 2010, 2). Like 
Basel I (1988) and Basel II (2004), Basel III was incorporated into the EU framework of 
cooperation by follow-up EU legislation.  The Commission’s legislative proposals were 
released in July 2011: a 1,000-page legislative package including a twin Capital 
Requirements Regulation (CRR) and Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV).  The 
EP and the Council of Ministers, the EU’s two legislatures, reached an agreement in 
March 2013 after twenty months of negotiations.  Members of the EP (MEPs) were 
early on interested in shaping the Basel III Accord, and, once the Commission proposals 
entered the EP, promoted positions that both undercut strong interests in the financial 
industry and, on some points, overrode the European Commission’s longstanding 
preference to act as a ‘champion of regulatory harmonization’ (Véron 2012, 9; Véron, 
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2008; Quaglia, 2010).  We examine the pattern of EP engagement and assess outcomes 
on the basis of extensive and original primary evidence.  Interestingly, the CRR/CRDIV 
on some points deviated from the Basel III Accord.  We draw upon 19 elite interviews 
conducted between September 2012 and May 2014 with key MEPs, their staff, EP 
committee secretariats, two services of the European Commission (DG MARKT; 
Secretariat-General), two well-placed observers of the trilogue process from the Council 
of Ministers, and 8 key stakeholder organizations spanning producer and public interest 
domains, banks, and interest groups established at both European and national level.   
 
The Logic of Executive Transgovernmentalism 
Financial harmonization is characterized by multi-level regulation at the global, EU, and 
national levels (Wessel and Wouters, 2008).  At the global level, the key arena for 
regulation is the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), or Basel 
Committee, founded in 1974 within the framework of the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS).  The Basel Committee has been described as a cross-governmental 
network of regulators, and an early example of executive transgovernmentalism 
(Slaughter 2004).   
 
There are several reasons for the entrenchment of executive power in the Basel process.  
Some of these are related to the organization of the process.  The membership of the 
Basel Committee is “deliberately” kept “small and selective” in order to promote 
efficiency, and has been described as having “highly homogeneous beliefs about the 
need for stability in the world banking system and how to maintain it” (Slaughter 2004, 
p.200).  The Basel Committee brings together central bankers and bank supervisors 
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from twenty-seven developed and developing countries. Lacking legal personality, the 
Basel Committee cannot issue legally-binding acts, but it nevertheless plays a key role 
in financial regulation and harmonization by diffusing benchmarks and codes of best 
practices, most notably in the so-called ‘Basel accords.’ Legislators and judges are not 
represented in the Committee; and some have argued that national bankers have used 
the Basel process to reinforce their position at home (Macey 2000; Slaughter 2004, 
p.48).  It is only in the implementation phase, when Basel soft law generates follow-up 
domestic legislation, that legislators and judges enter stage.  Other reasons are related to 
the nature of legislatures.  Legislatures are said to be inherently fragmented (their 
purpose is to represent cleavages), to have a parochial focus, and often to lack of 
expertise in complex technical matters, all of which complicate their involvement in 
global financial regulation (Slaughter 2004).  As representative institutions, one of the 
main functions of legislatures is to express cleavages and political divisions.  This gives 
rise to collective action problems.  Normally, parties and internal parliamentary 
organizations such as standing committees would be key devices through which these 
problems are reduced.  However, concerning global affairs, the incentives for parties to 
articulate interests are likely to be low, as ordinary voters do not tend to be interested in 
remote issues, and consequently do not reward politicians for their engagement.  
Furthermore, the notoriously technical character of expert standard setting in the Basel 
process is highly challenging for legislatures to make a difference.  Information 
asymmetry is a main reason why banking regulation in general is prone to regulatory 
capture and banks can undermine regulation through their operational practices 
(Underhill and Zhang, 2008; Baker, 2010). This does not mean that regulators operate 
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outside political constraints, but that, under normal circumstances, legislatures play an 
indirect role in global financial regulation through powers of delegation (Singer 2004). 
 
The articulation between the Basel process and EU regulation is extensive.  
Institutionally, one out of three members of the Basel Committee are EU member-
states; the European Commission and European Central Bank have observer status.  
Politically, the role of the EU is bolstered by the fact that the EU adopts its own 
common standards within the framework of single market regulation.  Traditionally, 
member-states enjoyed considerable power in this process qua their exclusive role in 
implementing EU directives.  However, in response to the financial crisis, the EU has 
centralized its process by relying more increasingly on regulations (rather than 
directives), which bind member-states bind themselves both to the objectives of EU 
intervention and the means to pursue them.  Regulatory centralization highlights the 
political significance of the EU market, for ‘market size alone is insufficient as a 
determinant of regulatory influence’ (young 2014; see also Bach and Newman 2007; 
and Posner 2009).1    
 
Turning to the EP’s role in the Basel process, we must distinguish between the 
negotiation of the Basel accords themselves, and the EU’s ‘implementation’ of these 
accords.  In the Basel process itself, and in accordance with the logic of executive 
transgovernmentalism, the “European Parliament only has a role to play at the end of 
the negotiation process, namely when the Council approves an international agreement 
to which the EC becomes a party.  The Council can do this only after consulting the 
                                                          
1 Global commercial banks sit among a diversely structured population comprising 
almost 8000 banks headquartered in Europe.   
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European Parliament” (De Meester 2008, p.121).  This role is a consequence of the 
informal status of the Basel process, which is not legally binding on EU legislation.  It 
is a weak role, which does not grant the EP any power in defining the content of global 
standards.  The EP has criticized its lack of voice opportunity in the Basel process by 
casting a doubt on the democratic legitimacy of the process altogether.  In a report on 
the Basel II negotiations drafted by its Committee on Legal Affairs, MEPs argued that 
“Basel II was agreed outside the legislative procedures of the European Community, 
which might justify doubts as to the democratic mandate of the proposal” (De Meester 
2008, p.121).  They have also tried “to know more about the positions the EU is 
officially taking through dialogue and discussion with the relevant officials” (Vander 
Stichele 2008, p.27).  When the EU introduces legislation in response to Basel 
proposals, the situation is different because in financial regulation the EP has had co-
decision power well before the Lisbon Treaty.  What the EP cannot do in Basel because 
it lacks representation can in principle be attempted in the EU’s post-Basel phase, where 
it enjoys co-decision power.  Quaglia has argued that EU legislation introduced in 
response to the Basel process brings “supranational bodies (like the EP) squarely into 
the picture” (Quaglia 2010, p.65).  
 
The EP and the ‘Europeanization’ of the Basel process  
Europeanization is often understood as the process by which EU norms, institutions, 
and regulation are brought home to the different EU member-states (Ladrech 1994; 
Börzel 1999; Radaelli 2003).  This makes sense from a state-centered perspective where 
the main question on the agenda is how EU matters for national politics, but it is less 
useful in order to understand what role the EU plays in bringing global regulation to 
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Europe.  Shifting the analytic focus to the EU as a global actor, Europeanization may be 
understood as the process by which global norms are brought home to the EU.  In this 
process, international regulation is infused with distinctive values and goals carried by 
EU policy-makers , reflecting the degree of regulatory centralization and involvement 
of elected political leaders at the EU level.  Thus understood, Europeanization provides 
an overarching framework for exploring the phenomenon of ’regulatory centralization’ 
which has been going on in the EU in the last decade and is redistributing influence in 
transatlantic relations (Posner 2009; Young 2014).  We use this framework of 
Europeanization in a heuristic way as we are not interested here in testing formal 
hypotheses but generating ‘descriptive-empirical knowledge’ (Young 2014). 
 
We have several reasons to expext the MEPs will be in the driver’s seat of this process.  
First, in the last decade a new era of parliamentarization has started, where MEPs have 
supplemented their quest for legislative empowerment on internal matters with a will to 
parliamentarize the external relations of the EU.  This point is illustrated by the recent 
EP rejection of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Dür and Mateo, 
2014), as well asserting a strong European public interest position in legislation with 
extra-terrestrial effects, such as the current revision of the General Data Protection 
Regulation (Clark, 2013; Dembosky and Fontanella Khan, 2013). As one of the most 
technical and opaque policy areas (Adamati and Hellwig, 2013), financial regulation 
represents a critical test of MEPs’ will and ability to bring external relations to public 
scrutiny.  Proving their efficacy in this area would enable MEPs to generalize their 
claim to policy competence.  Likewise, as one of the most globally integrated policy 
areas, financial regulation provides MEPs with an ideal site to pursue this strategy of 
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‘parliamentarizing’ global relations, counterbalancing the role of executive actors in an 
area which has been characterize by growing regulatory centralization.  Second, MEPs 
benefit from a ’carte blanche’ effect arising from the fact that they are not institutionally 
involved in negotiating Basel accords.  The Commission has indeed tended to interpret 
its role in EU legislation in these matters as ‘transposing’ the Basel process (Quaglia, 
2010).  In doing so, not only has the Commission abstained itself from using its agenda-
setting power, it has also tied the hands of the Council by basing a great deal of EU 
directives on the content of the Basel process.  The EP must assuredly give its consent 
to the overall agreement reached in the Basel process, but it has long set its sights on the 
thin democratic underpinning of the process and tends to perceive the ‘implementation’ 
of the Basel process as a new game, in which it is freed from commitments contracted 
during the negotiations.  Third, MEPs can be expected to be lobbied by a range of 
stakeholders, which are not well represented in the Basel process and seek inclusion in 
the phase of implementation.  Consumers of financial services are highly diverse, and 
the regulation of ‘business to business’ transactions inevitably results in competitive 
interest group politics (Young, 2012).  One may expect those whose preferences are not 
reflected in the Basel accords to link up with MEPs, who can use their discretionary 
power to ‘pick and choose’ from among the detail of preferences presented by different 
stakeholders and regulators in favour of stricter or more lax regulation.  Finally, in the 
last few years, MEPs have benefitted from relatively favorable political opportunities as 
the financial crisis gives high public salience to the behavior of financial actors and 
provides them with an opportunity to bring principled positions to the fore.  
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EP influence requires the development of organizational and policy knowledge as well 
as a collective sense of purpose.  Knowledge is a sine qua non of EP agency.  This 
condition covers both organizational knowledge, i.e., an understanding of how the Basel 
process works and how MEPs can shape it at its different stages; and policy knowledge, 
i.e., an understanding of the policy details sufficient to grasp the issues of stake behind 
the technical jargon and formulate policy alternatives (Busby 2013).  As it takes time to 
develop institutional capabilities of this type, EP agency will develop incrementally 
with each round of the Basel process along a recognizable set of themes.  Provided 
growing organizational knowledge, one should expect MEPs to expand their repertoires 
of action over time and increasingly to seek to shape the negotiations ahead of the 
implementation phase.     
  
In the implementation phase, the practice of ‘trilogues’ imposes limitations to EP power 
through the need to agree legislation through inter-institutional negotiation.  In 
CRR/CRD IV, the trilogue process involved almost 40 inter-institutional meetings to 
negotiate the final legislative agreement.  There is disagreement as to which institutions 
gain most from trilogues (Costa et al, 2011; Häge and Kaeding 2007; Kardasheva, 
2012; Rasmussen and Reh, 2013).  EP negotiators are always subject to pressures 
exerted by member states.  Influencing legislation at this stage requires that the EP 
negotiators prioritize their goals and maintain unity on a cross-party basis.  This sense 
of collective purpose partly depends upon the skills of the Rapporteur and the EP 
Committee Chair, but its origins are usually to be found in the development of an esprit 
de corps among the Rapporteur and the Shadow Rapporteurs in working together on a 
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legislative file over a long period of time at the committee level.  In the case of 
CRR/CRDIV this was a period of almost four years (2009-2013). 
 
In sum, MEPs are equipped with the constitutional power to amend the adoption of 
Basel standards;  unlike Commission officials who commit themselves to the 
framework qua their participation in the early phase of the negotiations, MEPs can use 
their little formal involvement in the Basel process to reopen negotiations at this stage 
on selected points of interest.  They have good reasons to do this in an era where the EP 
turns to global politics as a site of power, at a time when the financial crisis is 
propicious for furthering principled positions, and as parties whose preferences are not 
reflected in the Basel process might call them to do so. This requires a more systematic 
assessment of the EP’s policy-making contribution to the Basel process. 
 
Responding to the Basel III process: the European Parliament’s policy-making 
contribution 
Basel III was a response to the failure of regulation to prevent the global financial crisis, 
underpinned by a public sense of indignation (Woll, 2012). The newly-established G-
20, encouraged by a broad coalition of transatlantic civil society actors (Kastner, 2014), 
identified a total 39 action items aimed at improving financial regulation in their 
Summit declaration of November 2008, accounting for almost all of their meeting 
conclusions (Rottier and Véron 2010, 2).  As a result, the Basel III accord was agreed in 
November 2010, only seven years after the Basel II accord (but more than twenty years 
after Basel I).  A key difference between the two accords was to extend the scope of 
regulation beyond capital to embrace liquidity and leverage.  Basel I and II regulation 
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had involved international standard setting for the levels of capital which banks should 
hold in order to be able to absorb losses at times of stress.  The detail of these had been 
partly based upon internal capital risk exposure weighting models used by the banks 
themselves (Lall, 2012; Young, 2012).  Basel II rules had therefore allowed banks to 
rely too extensively upon a wider range of assets which resulted in them being highly 
leveraged (Howarth and Quaglia, 2013), particularly in the case of some European 
banks (Young, 2014), and of insufficient value during a global financial crisis of 
unprecedented scale.  Basel III therefore sought to increase capital holding levels, 
change risk weights and tighten definitions of the more secure types of capital 
(Common Equity Tier 1), and introduce capital buffers, as well as measures to raise 
liquidity and reduce leverage.  Nonetheless, Basel III still left risk exposure weighting 
models used by the banks themselves largely as they had been with Basel II standards 
(Lall, 2012).  The question of whether to develop further regulatory standards on the 
banks internal risk models, and if so what form these might take, would have to be left 
to expert banking supervisory bodies to develop, which in the case of the EU meant the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) newly established in 2011. 
 
Like previous Basel accords, Basel III was incorporated into the EU framework of 
cooperation by follow-up EU legislation, but unlike in the past, EU legislators this time 
adopted not just a Directive on capital requirements (the so-called CRD IV) but also a 
Regulation (CRR) providing a single rulebook in this domain.  The addition to the 
legislative package of a Regulation (in addition to a Directive component) centralized 
EU regulation in this domain by reducing the scope for regulatory arbitrage among the 
member states and creating more uniform application of standards.  The EP played a 
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key role in this process since both legislative acts were subject to co-decision.  The 
Commission’s legislative proposals were issued in July 2011. The sheer size of the 
CRR/CRD IV legislative package contained the characteristic mixture of technical 
expertise and opacity characteristic of financial regulation.  The technical content of the 
CRR/CRD IV package involved the designation of ECON as lead committee in the EP; 
EcoFin took the lead in the Council.  In the EP, the MEPs active on CRR/CRD IV 
included: the Rapporteur, Othmar Karas (Austrian, EPP); the Shadow Rapporteurs from 
the main parties in the EP on ECON—Udo Bullmann (German, PES); Vicky Ford, 
(UK, ECR); and Philippe Lamberts (Belgium, Greens/EFA); as well as the Chair of 
ECON (Sharon Bowles, ALDE, UK).  These MEPs, drawn from five different parties, 
were involved in compositing the amendments submitted by MEPs on the Karas report.  
ECON considered 2,200 detailed amendments to the CRR/CRD IV legislative package 
between November 2011 and February 2012.  The team agreed upon a package of 
compromise amendments, which were approved unanimously by ECON in May 2012.  
The ensuing phase of trilogue negotiations between the Council and the EP was 
concluded in April 2013.   
 
Whilst the EU did not played a prominent role on the global stage in financial regulation 
(Mugge, 2011; Quaglia, 2014), there is clear evidence that the parliamentary process 
infused the European transposition of Basel III accords with distinctive features.  
Indications of this could already be found in the set of new European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs) for financial regulation voted through by the European Parliament in 
September 2010 (Kastner, 2014), and in the July 2011 Commission CRR/CRD IV 
legislative proposals themselves.  Observers found that “the proposed legislation (fourth 
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Capital Requirements Directive and Capital Requirements Regulation …) diverges from 
Basel III on some aspects of the definition of regulatory capital” (Véron 2012, p.14); 
and furthermore interpreted this move as an illustration that the Commission, once “a 
determined champion of global regulatory harmonization throughout the 1990s and 
2000s … has shifted markedly since 2008 towards a more unilateralist stance” (Véron 
2012, p.9). In the EP, the Green Party, and the Party of European Socialists (PES) 
joined trade unions and NGOs in the formation of the ‘Europeans for Financial Reform’ 
(EFFR) campaign to play an active part in the process of reforming financial regulation 
(Kastner, 2014). Once in the EP, the Commission draft was subjected to a number of 
important modifications.  In line with the EP’s modus operandi, these modifications 
took the form of ‘add-ons,’ whereby MEPs introduced several ideas that were neither in 
the Commission’s draft nor in the Basel III accords, and corrected the line impulse by 
these institutions.  These “add-ons,” or corrective ideas, were of three main types, and 
which had not appeared in the Commission’s legislative proposal of July 2011.   
 
• Preservation of mutual protection schemes used successfully by German and 
Austrian savings banks, and measures to soften the impact of regulation upon 
the supply of lending to SMEs.  
 
• Remuneration, in which variable pay may not exceed fixed pay unless a 
‘shareholder override mechanism’ (requiring a 66-75% majority, depending on 
circumstances) extends this to a ceiling of twice fixed pay with deferred 
elements.     
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• Transparency related measures, including: public disclosure of leverage ratios; 
country by country reporting of profits subsidies and taxes; blacklisting 
miscreants; and hypothetical benchmarking (requiring justification of capital 
levels which fall below a benchmark set above the minimum requirement). 
 
These add-ons survived throughout the legislative process into the final legislation.  
They must be considered as significant corrections.  While the outcomes of EU 
legislation on savings banks and SMEs did not receive much media coverage, it is 
important to note that these measures are technically not Basel compliant, which Karas 
presents as evidence that the Commission was more attentive to the lead provided by 
the European Parliament than to the Basel III accord.  Nonetheless, these measures were 
supported by a number of key countries in the Council (Germany, France and Austria). 
 
MEPs also lost battles.  Among the items that the Parliament unsuccessfully sought to 
amend were tighter proposals on leverage and a faster timetable for the introduction of 
the LCR (with implementation sought in 2018 instead of 2019).  On this issue the 
Commission took the same view as the revised Basel Committee position, informed by 
a concern that the effect might be to incentivize a shift from lending to more liquid 
assets such as cash and central bank deposits (European Commission, 2013).   There 
were similar issues surrounding the introduction of a new leverage ratio.  The final 
legislative position on leverage, requiring disclosure of leverage ratios by 2015, and 
leaving the question open as to the introduction of a binding leverage ratio by 2018 or 
whether to leave this as a matter of national flexibility, reflects a political agreement in 
which the EP’s tighter proposals were squeezed out.  However, the final agreement was 
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sufficient to create problems for some of the larger banks, particularly from France and 
Germany, with high leverage ratios. 
 
All in all, within the given framework of the Basel / Commission proposals, MEPs were 
able to achieve policy gains that both undercut strong interests in the financial industry 
and, on some points, overrode the European Commission’s longstanding preference 
(Véron, 2008; Quaglia, 2010) for a strict harmonization of the Basel standards.  In the 
following sections, we examine how MEPs secured these gains. We start by noting that 
policy achievements represented the fruits of sustained work going back to previous 
Basel negotiations.  The financial crisis provided MEPs with an opportunity to bring 
principled positions to the fore and break the deadlock of vested interests.  Beyond the 
crisis, new ideas and a more pluralistic environment are underpinned by the 
institutionalization of consumer interests undertaken under the aegis of individual 
MEPs.    
 
A Revisionist EP 
In this section we demonstrate how the EP was able to draw upon its own resources as a 
means of establishing an independent and technically credible position in a policy field 
of notorious complexity, and establish a mechanism to make it well placed to develop a 
leading role on a key point of departure in the EU position from Basel standards. 
Prelude to power: A Growing Reservoir of Ideas and Expertise 
Both the idea of a cap on bank bonuses and the idea of differentiating standards in 
reflection of the various risk profiles of different types of businesses had been 
unsuccessfully pursued before.  One of the chief authors of the cap on bank bonuses, 
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Philippe Lamberts, stressed that the Greens had already tried to push this idea through 
during the course of EU legislation on CRDIII in 2006.  Back then, the idea had failed 
at the first hurdle, i.e., at the Committee stage of debate in the EP, when the Greens had 
sought to introduce it.  But the idea had emerged and been refined to a point where the 
Greens were satisfied that they had “a matrix” to work with, which enabled them to 
specify their preference within a broader universe of policy options emphasizing 
different combinations of cash / non-cash remunerations and immediate / differed 
remunerations (Interview, 8.3.2013).  They came out of those negotiations with the 
conviction that the immediate cash component could not exceed a certain threshold.  
Similarly, the issue of SMEs and savings banks was not the first time that MEPs had 
advocated a differentiated treatment of business on the basis of their risk profile.  .  
“The draft report [of the EP] called for a regulation that was ‘risk-based’, arguing that 
the risk profile of custodian banks was different from that of central securities 
depositories” (Quaglia 2010, p.118-9). The framework and the actors were different, but 
the approach of the EP was essentially the same.   
 
Building on these early experiences, MEPs could draw on a growing reservoir of 
expertise.  Expertise is the nerve of war in financial regulation, where information 
asymmetry strengthens financial actors.  The EP has traditionally struggled with this 
problem.  In 2008, Vander Stichele recorded that “the capacity of ECON members and 
their assistants to deal with the [financial regulation] matters is not … sufficient, 
certainly not compared with US congress members—who have much more assistants” 
(Vander Stichele, 2008, p.27).  However, by 2008, the EP could mobilize a very 
respectable reservoir of in-house expertise on a range of financial issues.  “The 
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expertise of some of the ECON members is high, as can be seen in 2008 in the detailed 
resolutions and own initiative reports with recommendations to the Commission on 
regulation of hedge funds and private equity, transparency of institutional investors, and 
the ‘Lamfalussy follow-up…’” (Vander Stichele, 2008, p.27).  A first step involved 
procuring an independent critique of the European Commission’s impact assessment 
accompanying CRR/CRD IV (European Parliament, 2009).  Shortly afterwards, the EP 
established an Economic Governance Unit with the specific purpose in the first instance 
of building up expertise in banking supervision, and the first unit in a long-term plan (to 
2025) for the EP to acquire its own in-house expertise capable of undertaking impact 
assessments independently from the European Commission (European Parliament, 
2013).    
 
It is against this background that Lamberts and Karas were determined to set the agenda 
on the CRR/CRD IV legislation.  Lamberts had taken over the EU dossier on Basel II 
when it was already well underway and in an unreceptive EP.  This time, he benefitted 
from a context dominated by the financial crisis: there was a political will that banks 
would have to take a back seat in the new regulatory standards. Karas was driven by the 
aspiration to bring parliamentarians back in international regulation.  In his own words, 
“the involvement of the EP in the process of international agreements is becoming more 
important.  My interest is to parliamentarize international negotiations, i.e., to involve 
parliamentary actors” (interview, 18.9.2012).  It is surprising that MEPs with such 
different background and political orientations found common cause on such an issue, 
but the centrists’—among whom Karas may be counted—dislike for monopolistic 
business practices dovetailed with the Greens’ focus on broader consumer concerns. 
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Leveling Up with Basel: The ECON Team and Its Tools of Influence 
There is no doubt that the ECON team, which worked on the EU package, was both 
technically and politically strong.  The ECON secretariat doubled during the period 
covered by the CRD file.  We were also informed in a number of interviews in the EP 
that this particular EP Committee was notable for the depth of technical knowledge 
among the assistants to MEPs.  Othmar Karas, the Rapporteur appointed by ECON in 
2009, was vice-president of the EP and had a professional background in financial 
services.  The presence of two members from the UK parties of government ensured 
that the UK’s dominant position in the EU on financial services was well represented.  
The Greens, around Philippe Lamberts, could draw upon a substantial pool of expertise 
on financial services, which comprised French Pascal Canfin, a former journalist for the 
monthly economic magazine Alternatives Économiques, and German Sven Giegold, one 
of the founding members of ATTAC Germany.  Giegold was also the Rapporteur for 
another legislative financial services measure under consideration shortly after 
CRR/CRD IV, aimed at the activities of fund managers, UCITS (Undertakings for 
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities) V.  This raised the stake of 
establishing new regulatory principles in CRR/CRD IV, which the team wanted to carry 
forward into subsequent legislative files.  Together with the Chair of ECON Sharon 
Bowles, Karas could draw upon a working team with both knowledge of banking 
supervision and a collective political will to leave the Parliament’s hallmark on the 
legislation.  Despite the obvious differences of approach, this team formed a relatively 
cohesive working group to take CRR/CRD IV together in the EP.  ECON illustrates 
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very well the tendency for EP committees to evolve “an identity and esprit de corps of 
[their] own” (Corbett et al 2011, p.106).   
 
At a later stage, producer interests emphasized more the determination of the ‘Green 
team’ than their collective expertise in their public commentary, though this may be 
sour grapes; the Greens were certainly taken seriously in financial circles.  Lamberts 
told us that the civil servants from the UK Treasury made a point of calling by his office 
during trips to Brussels.  The European public affairs manager of a large global 
commercial bank made an observation that what he had seen in 2013 was “an 
increasingly self-confident, very determined European Parliament.  They’ve done a 
remarkable job with CRR/CRD IV.  The quality has been good” (interview, 20.3.2013).   
 
The EP held a public hearing on financial regulation in May 2010, hoping to agenda-set 
not just the EU legislative process, but the Basel III negotiations themselves.  The 
Secretary-General of the BCBS was one of the keynote speakers, although the content 
suggests that the purpose was to inform the EP rather than to consult with it (Walter, 
2010).  The hearing helped to inform an own-initiative report led by Karas adopted in 
September 2010.  This placed the Commission in the unprecedented situation where it 
had to react to both the Basel accord and the EP report when drafting its proposals.  
According to Karas and Commission officials, this approach led to the incorporation of 
key EP points in the Commission proposals (interviews, 18.9.2012; 7.3.2013).   
 
The other tool was the informal institution of ‘parliamentary intergroups.’  Intergroups 
are fora enabling MEPs from any political groups and committees to hold “informal 
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exchanges of views on particular subjects and promote contact between Members and 
civil society”.  Any MEP may join an intergroup but intergroups must be endorsed by at 
least three political groups, and there is a statutory limit to how many intergroups 
political groups may endorse.  In November 2010, i.e., one month before the Basel III 
accords were reached, Othmar Karas became the chairman of a new intergroup on 
SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises). The intergroup was Karas’s idea, and he 
asked a contact at the EU SME association UEAPME to organize extra-parliamentary 
input (interviews, 18.9.2012).  This intergroup provided the main conduit for exchange, 
organization, and mobilization of SME and SME-related interests. SME organizations 
worked in concert with Austrian banks, the German Savings Banks Association 
(DSGV) and the European Savings Bank Group, to reformulate the one-size-fits-all 
approach adopted by the Basel III accords, which, they claimed, treated them unfairly in 
regard to their low risk activities.  The idea was to promote a risk-based approach: 
“Basel III originally only looked at the passive side, and did NOT look at RISKS at all 
on the asset side.  We say if we want to combine more capital requirements with NO 
other costs for SMEs, then we have to change the risk factor for SME loans” (interview, 
UEAPME, 18.9.2012).  On these issues, the European Commission was reluctant to 
depart from the Basel line: “the European Commission follows the Basel Committee 
model, which has in mind one actor: the transnationally active joint-stock market 
company.  The Commission argues that this is due to the single market. When the issue 
reached the White Paper stage, we voiced our opinion but to no avail.  So we had to go 
to the EP” (Interview, EU-Repräsentanz Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband, 
4.3.2013).  The Commission’s perspective was informed by its long-standing push for a 
strict implementation of the Basel standards: the argument was that ”if we weaken 
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implementation then we cannot blame the others, so we want to fulfill our 
commitments.  The area where we can be criticized by the US is the new SME risk-
rate” (Interview, UEAPME, 18.9.2012). This deadlock could only be broken through 
EP activism.  The position of savings banks had been introduced to the EP’s positions 
“elegantly and without much discussion” according to one well-placed observer 
(interview, European Parliament, 4.3.2013).   
 
These tools were the vessels through which the risk-based approach was distilled into 
the Basel process at EU level in spite of the opposition of the Commission.  The idea of 
a cap on remuneration followed another path.  Lamberts and his team introduced this 
idea late into the legislative stream; by the trilogue stage it was clear that only one 
member state would oppose it.  The strategy the EP followed on this point, as well as 
other points still controversial at that stage, is described in the next section.   
 
A final element of the expert input generated by ECON involved one of its (Green 
Party) members providing pump-priming funding (from his own pocket) in 2011 to 
launch the NGO Finance Watch until resources from other NGOs, trade unions, and 
now the European Commission, secured longer term funding.   They recruited as core 
staff financial services specialists, including one with experience in a public affairs 
consultancy.  Resourcing is now at a level sufficient to maintain a staff of 14.  The niche 
of Finance Watch is specifically to counter the monopoly on the supply of financial 
services expertise to political institutions which producer sources previously enjoyed.  
Whilst its formation came relatively late into the development of the CRR/CRD IV file, 
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some of its ‘fingerprints’ can be found in the text of the legislative agreement (in 
particular, Article 90 of CRD IV). 
 
Opening up the Black Box of the Trilogues 
Trilogues are often presented as the black box of EU legislation.  At this stage, the 
negotiations are out of the hands of stakeholders.  This has typically been portrayed as 
problematic from a democratic point of view.  On the other hand, politicians have to 
account for their decisions in the post-trilogue phase, and there are mechanisms of 
democratic oversight in both the Council of Ministers (CoM) and in the European 
Parliament.  In the CoM there is an orientation debate involving Ministers at the outset, 
and changes to the Council’s position are regularly updated in COREPER, the 
ambassadorial level .  In the Parliament, Rule 70 of the Rules of Procedure, coupled 
with Annex 21, require that the negotiating team report back to Committee after each 
Trilogue, and in exceptional circumstances (such as time constraints) to the political 
group co-ordinators in committee.  The EP has a negotiating team, monitored by the 
Chair of the Committee (or nominated representative), the political group observers, as 
well as the Rapporteur and Shadow Rapporteurs.  The ECON committee is notable in 
that the Chair (7th term) attends every Trilogue meeting on almost every file, which 
provides for group cohesion and common ownership over a series of prioritized goals.  
Where issues are of a high public saliency, the EP negotiators can use public opinion to 
press their opponents (Rasmussen, 2014).  
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In the Shadow of Public Opinion 
Interviews we conducted in the European Parliament, as well as among banks that had 
actively lobbied on CRR/CRD IV, provided extensive confirmation about the 
Rapporteurs and Shadow Rapporteurs receiving delegations from national 
administrations.  In return for information about the political process, national civil 
servants provided MEPs with technical information.  The EP Secretariat also drew upon 
secondments from national finance ministries during the lifetime of the measure as a 
means of supplying expertise to ECON.   
 
In addition to securing its supply of expertise during this phase, the EP delegation 
developed political leverage through front-loading the political items during the 
trilogues.  According to one well-placed Council observer, this is a good trilogue 
strategy where there are points of strong contestation between the two institutions, and 
is worked out informally by officials from the respective institutions beforehand.  The 
length of the legislative file meant that most of the team had to choose the areas upon 
which to specialize.  It was therefore essential for the EP trilogue negotiation team to 
establish its list of priorities among contested issues, and those with the highest public 
profile were front-loaded. This may sound paradoxical given that trilogue removes 
debate temporarily from public scrutiny in order to facilitate compromises.  Still, the 
strength of public opinion about the role of banks in the financial crisis shaped the 
trilogue negotiations on CRR/CRD IV.  MEPs were partly aided by their good fortune.  
One of the key arguments of the UK, that the cap would result in a flight of talent to 
Switzerland, was ultimately undermined during trilogue negotiations by the decisive 
result of a Swiss referendum in favour (68%) of a cap on bankers’ bonuses.  For the 
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most part, however, the Greens and other members of the ECON team cultivated public 
opinion. Their strategy was to “squeeze the finance ministers between a rock (the EP) 
and a hard place (public opinion)” (Interview, European Parliament, Brussels, 
8.3.2013).  Sven Giegold launched an electronic petition two days before launching the 
conclusions of the negotiations in the media.  Beyond these actions, negotiations 
progressed under the permissive consensus created by the financial crisis that banks 
would have to take a back seat.  As one participant in the trilogue told us, “it boils down 
to public pressure.  If they had said, it’s not important, then we could have scandalized” 
(Interview, European Parliament, Brussels, 8.3.2013).  ‘Public opinion’ did not have to 
be there to exert power.  It had latent power.   
 
The flip side of this strategy was that MEPs lost most of the items that carried less 
public significance because they were too complex to be communicated easily to the 
broader public. CRR defers the establishment of a key element of liquidity, a Liquidity 
Coverage Requirement (LCR), to a phase-in period from 2015-2018 through delegation 
of powers to the European Commission, allowing for a period of observation as to the 
potential impact upon bank lending of the rate at which the LCR is introduced.  The EP 
had clearly wanted an earlier introduction.  However, the technical nature of the issue 
meant it carried much less public significance than bankers’ bonuses, and the EP 
negotiators gave way on LCR to achieve the high profile cap on remuneration.  LCR 
had been the first priority for the French banks, in particular, where the relationship 
with the responsible Commissioner, Barnier, appeared to be a factor which helped to 
secure the legislative outcome.  The leverage ratio was the main priority for the large 
German banks due to their high ratios, although less so for British banks which had 
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already succeeded in bringing down their rates.  Whilst the final outcome was less than 
the Parliament had sought, it was still to a timescale uncomfortable enough for 
Deutsche Bank to issue further equity after the trilogue agreement (Commerzbank had 
undertaken related measures 12 months previously; Howarth and Quaglia, 2013) as a 
means to respond to market pressures.  If the EP caved in quietly on LCR and leverage 
so as to secure its main prize of a cap on bankers’ bonuses, the loss would be unlikely to 
be noticed in public discourse.  An intriguing postscript is that when we returned to the 
European Parliament in May 2014 for a further round of interviews, we were informed 
that the Council had, in retrospect, reflected that the Parliament had also been right to 
push – successfully – for the inclusion of certain transparency related measures in the 
final legislative package. 
 
Sealing the result: Issue-trading and Discipline within the EP Delegation 
The overall scorecard for the EP also masked the subtleties of the political process of 
issue trading within the EP itself.  ALDE and ECR went along with the principle of a 
cap on bankers’ bonuses in order to secure sufficient modifications to its detail.  The 
version agreed in the EP ultimately survived in final legislation, that variable pay may 
not exceed fixed pay unless a ‘shareholder override mechanism’ (requiring a 66-75% 
majority, depending on circumstances) extends this to a ceiling of twice fixed pay with 
deferred elements.    The topic was an issue largely driven by the Greens in ECON 
(Lamberts, Canfin, and Giegold).  The feats of the Greens received broader public 
acclaim, as it was widely perceived to undercut the position of vested interests in the 
financial industry: a Financial Times feature profiled Lamberts as ‘The man who 
capped the banks’ (Barber and Schäfer, 2013) and Giegold as ‘The newest scourge of 
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the industry’ (Sullivan, 2013). The front cover of the French weekly magazine Télérama 
proclaimed ‘Canfin, Foe of Finance’ (Remy, 2012).  This team had originally sought a 
more restrictive version on remuneration (a ceiling of one half of fixed pay paid as 
variable pay), but had agreed to soften this in order to achieve the backing of 
Rapporteur Karas as well as the British Conservative Shadow Rapporteur Vicky Ford.  
Ford’s support was significant because of her membership of the leading party of 
government of the United Kingdom, and helped isolate the UK’s opposition to a cap on 
remuneration.  
 
By giving way in order to obtain consensus among the entire EP team negotiating with 
the Council of Ministers in trilogue, the Greens (supported by the Socialists) secured the 
outcome they had sought.  An observer from one of the institutional secretariats present 
during the entire trilogue negotiation process noted a high degree of discipline between 
the Parliament’s negotiating team throughout (interview, 6.3.2013). CRD/CRR was an 
outlier in terms of the large number of trilogue meetings involved, and the esprit de 
corps between the EP team appears from Lambert’s public account of the process, in 
which he praised EPP member Karas for the way he fought ‘like a lion’ for team 
positions (Lamberts, 2013, p.11).  In turn, during the joint EP/Council debate on the 
final legislative package, Karas paid tribute to what had been achieved ‘thanks to the 
positive negotiating spirit of the five major political groups’, the individual trilogue 
negotiatiors from which received thanks from the subsequent Council Presidency 
speaker (Council of the European Union, 2013).  This tactic involved mixed degrees of 
sacrifice.  Allowing for elements of national flexibility would mean higher standards in 
key member states, most notably in the UK where higher regulatory standards pre-dated 
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a number of measures being introduced at EU level (Independent Commission on 
Banking, 2011; Howarth and Quaglia, 2013).  Yet for the UK ECR member, as well as 
the Chair of ECON, cooperating to secure the cap on bankers bonuses also meant going 
against the position of their national parties of (coalition) government. 
 
Conclusion: EU financial reform between globalization and parliamentarization 
In this paper, we claim that the weak constitutional mandate of the EP in the Basel 
process helped to fuel the drive to underpin regulatory centralisation with democratic 
standards when MEPs established a role for their legislative assembly in the 
implementation phase.  Under normal conditions, MEPs are called on to defend and 
promote interests which have not received adequate considerations in the global  
negotiations.  The possibility to shape financial harmonization away from conventional 
corporate business norms is all the greater during the financial crisis when MEPs have 
the opportunity to bring principled positions to the fore.  However, given the multi-
national dimension of EP politics, an important precondition for MEPs to make a 
difference when faced with expected Council opposition is that they be able to draw on 
technically-persuasive arguments and a common sense of purpose.    
 
There is considerable evidence that the EP has learnt to act within its institutional 
mandate to make an impact upon the course of EU financial regulatory reform, a field 
long dominated by transgovernmental executive powers. In conformity with our 
expectations, the EP successfully introduced significant identifiable components into 
the final legislative package in the implementation of the Basel accords.  This is most 
apparent through politicized elements involving remuneration and transparency related 
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measures.  However, its impact upon less politicized components has also been felt, 
involving lending to small firms, and special measures to preserve long standing and 
largely successful arrangements for the survival of savings banks.  In other words, the 
Basel process is a ‘living institution,’ which in Europe has become infused with some of 
its own distinctive values and ideas.   
 
As we have traced the Europeanization of the Basel process, we do not find support for 
the thesis that the European Parliament is being increasingly drawn towards producer 
interests at the expense of its traditional leanings towards diffuse interests.  There is no 
tendency evident in this case towards convergence of EP and Council positions as a 
result of an ever more powerful Parliament.  Whilst CRR/CRD IV involved a highly 
complex and technical legislative file, a group of MEPs seized the opportunities offered 
by the financial crisis to expand their repertoires of action and promote alternative 
principles of action in the financial arena, seeking to agenda-set the EU response to the 
Basel process, and to make a distinctive contribution to the final legislative content.    
This knowledge – and political teamwork - came from within the Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs, supplemented by seconded resources from national 
ministries to the committee secretariat.  It was sufficient to enable it to counter 
arguments from producer lobbies where it most wanted to, and to reduce information 
asymmetries between the Commission and the Parliament to the extent that the EP 
could ensure that its ‘refreshing ideas’ should be accepted by the Commission.  This is 
an important qualification to the gloomy picture of over reliance upon the Commission 
as an information resource (Marshall, 2012).  Undoubtedly, its key prize, the cap on 
bankers’ bonuses, was more of a political concept than a technical one, and the prize of 
  
 
32 
public appeal helped to find agreement as to the extent of the cap among the EP trilogue 
negotiating team.  This prize eluded the ‘Green team’ on ECON next time round, when 
the EP narrowly voted (by seven votes) to reject a bonus cap in the UCITS V legislative 
file.  CRR/CRD IV had proved to be the “high-water mark of bonus bashing” (Barker 
and Marriage, 2013).  Fund managers are less in the public eye than bankers and 
sustaining the political momentum proved problematic for the Greens.  On less 
politicized issues the European Parliament is a more unpredictable place. 
 
Our case clearly demonstrates the deficiency of accounts of policy outcomes, which pay 
no attention to the contribution of the European Parliament.  Such a restricted focus is 
surprising given the long-standing role of the EP as a co-legislature.  The literature on 
financial regulation is particularly orientated in its focus upon transgovernmental 
executive power and intergovernmentalism, which forms a natural starting point given 
the role of the Basel accords.  But these involve standard setting, which requires 
territories to adapt and adopt as legislative measures, and here the role of parliaments is 
clear.  Against a generalized assumption that parliaments are ill equipped to cope with 
the technical demands of financial regulation, we have demonstrated that expertise 
sufficient to shape legislation is present in the European Parliament, and given political 
will EP goals of finding ways to demonstrate its value to civil society can be achieved.  
This dictates that the general direction of travel will still be towards ‘diffuse’ rather than 
producer interests on issues of high public salience. 
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